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Introduction
In a classic paper, Richard Rudner (1953) argued that ethical values are a required part of the internal workings of science. Since evidence never establishes a hypothesis H with certainty, scientists must decide whether the evidence is sufficiently strong to merit acceptance of H, and this decision reflects judgments about how bad it would be (in a typically ethical sense) to be mistaken in accepting or rejecting H. Thus, for example, we would demand stronger evidence before accepting the hypothesis that a new medical procedure for children is safe than before accepting the hypothesis that a manufactured lot of shampoo bottles meets desired quality specifications.
In a classic reply, Richard Jeffrey (1956 ) challenged Rudner's conclusion by denying that scientists are in the business of accepting or rejecting hypotheses in the first place. According to Jeffrey, scientists' job is to assign probabilities (degrees of belief) to hypotheses; it is then up to decision makers -with their social, political and ethical value commitments -to take action or not in light of those probabilities, that is, to determine whether the probabilities provided by scientists are high enough to warrant various courses of action. On what we might call a Jeffreyan view, the internal aspects of scientific research -including the assignment of probabilities to hypotheses -can and should remain free from the influence of social values. 1 Today, philosophers of science remain divided on the appropriate roles of ethical and social values in science. Some, like Heather Douglas (2000 Douglas ( , 2009 , argue that such values are a required part of the internal workings of science in much the way that Rudner suggested. Others, like Sandra Mitchell (2004) , seem to embrace something much closer to the Jeffreyan view. Recently, Eric Winsberg (2010 Winsberg ( , 2012 ; see also Biddle and Winsberg 2009 ) has offered a novel challenge to the Jeffreyan view. He argues that, when it comes to hypotheses about future climate change, it is infeasible for climate scientists to exclude the influence of social values when assigning probabilities. As he puts it: "Scientists cannot assign probabilities to hypotheses about future climate change-or, more specifically, estimate the uncertainties of climate predictions-in a manner that is free from non-epistemic considerations…" (2010, p.119) . 2 To begin to see what Winsberg has in mind, consider the following statement: The probability is 0.90 that global temperature will rise by between 2 and 3 degrees Celsius during the 21 st century if greenhouse gas emissions continue at current rates. This statement assigns a probability to a hypothesis about future warming. It is also a way of expressing uncertainty about how much warming would occur; instead of reporting that the temperature would definitely rise by, say, 2.1 degrees, an assignment of probability is made to an interval of change. Winsberg argues that social values unavoidably influence probabilistic uncertainty estimates like these. What is especially novel about his argument is its grounding in the practice of complex simulation modeling: assignments of probability to hypotheses about future climate change are influenced by social values, he argues, because of the way these values come into play in the building and evaluating of climate models, on whose results the assignments of probability depend.
The present paper has two main aims: first, to critically evaluate Winsberg's model-based challenge to the Jeffreyan view and, second, to show how a more traditional set of replies to Jeffrey seems tailor-made for the climate context. Section 2 provides background on climate modelling and on uncertainty in climate prediction. Section 3 presents a distilled version of Winsberg's argument. Section 4 raises two objections to the argument; while neither can wholly undermine his conclusion that social values have some unavoidable influence on uncertainty estimates in climate prediction, each suggests that social values exert less of an influence than he implies. Section 5 revisits a more traditional set of replies to Jeffrey. Without necessarily endorsing these replies, it is shown that they dovetail nicely with recent discussions -internal to climate science -about the estimation of uncertainty in climate prediction.
Models, ensembles and probabilities
To understand Winsberg's argument, we first need to appreciate that most quantitative predictions of future climate change are made with the help of computer simulation models. These models are needed in part because the causal processes that shape the evolution of climate are numerous, nonlinear, and interactive. They include the transfer of radiation through the atmosphere, the movement of large-scale weather systems, the formation of local clouds and precipitation, ocean currents, the forming and melting of polar ice sheets, and many more. Not even the most insightful scientist can expect to foresee, in detail, the spatial and temporal patterns of climate change that these interacting processes will produce in response to rising greenhouse gas concentrations. So scientists attempt to represent these processes and interactions mathematically and then estimate solutions to these equations (taking small time steps) with the help of computers; the goal is to simulate how Earth's climate would change if greenhouse gas emissions were to rise at particular rates in the future.
But there is uncertainty about how to build these climate models in such a way that predictions of future climate change will have desired accuracy. The uncertainty stems in part from a limited theoretical understanding of the climate system, but also from the constraints placed by available computing power -the computer simulation needs to finish running before climate actually changes, and this means that even physical processes that are well-understood may need to be represented in a simplified way. In many cases, it is far from obvious how to make these simplifications such that predictions with desired accuracy will be produced.
Uncertainty about how to model the climate system is usually partitioned conceptually into three P1 requires little explication, given the discussion of ensembles in the preceding section. P2 is also straightforward: if different choices had been made in the course of building today's climate models, then the projections of future climate change that they produce would be somewhat different. For instance, choosing to represent a process in one way rather than another will make some difference to the results. Biddle and Winsberg (2009; see also Winsberg 2010, Ch.6) have argued that even the order in which processes are added to a model makes a difference, as past modeling choices to some extent constrain future modeling choices; it simply may not work to represent a process in our model in a particular way, given that we have previously chosen to represent other processes in particular ways.
P3 and P4 are more complex. P3 relies on a distinction between epistemically forced and unforced choices in model building. This distinction is not entirely clear in Winsberg's discussion, but it seems to work as follows: An epistemically forced choice is one in which there are decisive, purely epistemic grounds for considering one model-building option to be better than all other available options, otherwise the choice is epistemically unforced. P3 asserts that many choices in the building of climate models are epistemically unforced, and that social values are what very often (if not always) lead scientists to prefer some options to others. Winsberg argues that there are at least two ways that social values exert an influence here (see e.g.
2012, p.124).
First, climate scientists may be aware that the available model-building options strike a different balance of inductive risks 7 with respect to a problem or task (e.g. the task of predicting whether changes in precipitation in a region will exceed some threshold) and may choose one option in light of its inductive risk profile. The choice reflects the value judgment that it would be worse (ethically or socially) to err in one way than in another. Second, modeling choices may be influenced by decisions to prioritize some predictive tasks over others -decisions which are themselves often shaped by social values. We prioritize the accurate simulation of changes in surface temperature, droughts and other weather extremes, for instance, because they have greater social and economic importance than many other quantities, e.g. the average height of the 200mb pressure surface. These prioritization decisions can influence subsequent choices in model building:
given particular predictive priorities, we might focus on improving our representation of one causal process rather than another, or we might decide that the next process to be added to the model will be one rather than another.
P4 relates to what Winsberg calls the "Bayesian response to the Douglas challenge" (BRDC). The
Douglas challenge -so named because it is attributed to Heather Douglas (2000; -is in effect a more general version of Winsberg's P3: doing science often involves epistemically unforced methodological choices whose options have different associated inductive risk profiles; such choices must be made on some grounds, and they often are (and should be) made in light of the judgment that it would be worse, ethically or socially, to err in one way than in another. According to the BRDC, this sort of influence on the part of social values can be screened out or compensated for via expert judgment -we can and should (on epistemic grounds) factor in the inductive risk profile of the method used. If a chosen method for detecting the presence of a disease has a tendency for false positives, for instance, we can and should take that into account when assigning probabilities to hypotheses in light of the results we obtain via that method.
P4 asserts that the BRDC is in practice unavailable in the case of ensemble climate prediction.
According to Winsberg, applying the BRDC would require that an epistemic agent "be capable of making an informed judgment about how every single methodological choice on which a climate model is built ought to influence his or her degree of belief in a hypothesis that he or she is evaluating with the use of that model" (2012, p.130) , presumably for each model involved in the ensemble study. Several factors combine to make such judgments out of reach: many of the methodological choices will have been made by other scientists, over the (perhaps decades-long) history of the model's development; the impact of a given choice on the model's results often will be sensitive to earlier and later choices; the interactions among choices will be complex and numerous and thus difficult to untangle, especially for the typical scientist whose expertise is concentrated in one or two areas, such as radiation physics (see also ibid, pp.125-129).
How exactly does Winsberg's argument present a novel challenge to the Jeffreyan view? The latter is sometimes characterized as the view that probabilities can and should be assigned to scientific hypotheses in a way that is free from the influence of social values. When expressed in this way, it is tempting to think that the Jeffreyan view requires that probability assignments should not reflect the influence of social values in any way. But in that case, the view could be easily dismissed via an argument that has nothing to do with complex simulation modeling. In particular, insofar as any assignment of probability to a hypothesis will depend on the state of current knowledge, which in turn will depend upon what we have found important enough to invest resources investigating, assignments of probability to scientific hypotheses will always be influenced by social values. On this interpretation, we would declare the Jeffreyan view a non-starter, and there would be no need Winsberg presents a novel challenge to the Jeffreyan view by arguing that, in some cases, state-of-theart methods for estimating the probabilities that should be assigned to hypotheses of interest in light of current understanding are model-based methods which are unavoidably sensitive to social values. Perhaps in an ideal Bayesian world our cognitive and computational powers would be great enough that we would not need to rely on such methods; we would be able to propagate probabilistic representations of structural, parametric and initial condition uncertainty to arrive at assignments of probability to future changes in climate, without the help of computers and without having to rely on simplified and somewhat distorted distillations of current knowledge (i.e. climate models). But in the real world -given the limits of our actual cognitive and computational capacities, as well as the limits of current understanding of the climate systemthis is not possible.
Evaluating Winsberg's argument
Has Winsberg offered a compelling challenge to the Jeffreyan view? Two objections to his argument will be discussed here. Neither will wholly undermine his conclusion that social values have some unavoidable, Pragmatic factors can also fill the gap. For instance, the scientists might already have in hand some computer code for process P but not for processes Q, R, or S. Or they might judge that it will be much easier to incorporate P than to incorporate Q or R or S, given past choices in model building. Or they might be experts on P but have much less understanding of Q and R and S. Or it might be that a leading modeling group incorporated P for reasons like those just identified, and now it is seen as de rigueur for state-of-the-art climate models to include P. And so on. Indeed, it is plausible that pragmatic factors like these often influence or even determine model development choices. So Winsberg needs to work harder to make the case that the influence of social values here is as pervasive and common as he suggests.
Winsberg may be tempted to reply that the fact that processes P, Q, R and S are the leading candidates is itself almost surely a function of social values: if social values hadn't led scientists to prioritize the accurate prediction of some quantities (e.g. changes in global mean temperature) rather than others, then they wouldn't have narrowed their focus to these processes to begin with. But even this is not so clear. The narrowing of focus might instead reflect non-decisive epistemic considerations. For instance, some climate system processes, such as the formation of clouds and precipitation, are thought to influence a broad range of climate variables/quantities in significant ways even on relatively short time scales, whereas other processes have smaller and/or more localized impact on those time scales; scientists might narrow their focus to a set of processes of the former type because not including them (or representing them poorly) can be expected to result in simulations that have significant errors in a wide range of climate variables/quantities. 9 No single, toppriority process might be identifiable on epistemic grounds alone, leaving the choice of which process to add next unforced, but the narrowing of focus might nevertheless have been driven by epistemic considerations.
The second objection relates to Winsberg's focus on methods that assign precise probabilities to hypotheses about future climate change. The objection is that this focus is somewhat misplaced: an argument that scientists cannot estimate "the uncertainties of climate predictions" in a manner that is free from the influence of social values ultimately should focus not on methods for producing precise probabilistic estimates -which are known to be artificially precise -but rather on methods for producing coarser depictions of uncertainty, since these coarser depictions can more accurately reflect the limits of current understanding. It will be suggested below, however, that any influence that social values exert in the production of these coarser estimates will be reduced compared to their influence on precise probabilistic estimates.
10
9 Of course, on longer time scales even processes of the latter type (e.g. various ocean processes) might be extremely important, insofar as they are nonlinearly coupled to other processes. 10 Just to be clear: I mean any influence of social values via the model-development process, in the ways suggested by Winsberg. First, though, it is worth explaining why precise probabilistic estimates of uncertainty about future climate change are artificially precise. The short explanation is that scientists do not yet understand the climate system well enough; one must know a lot to be a position to say with justification that the probability (degree of belief) that should be assigned to a hypothesis is 0.38 rather than 0.37 or 0.39. Current scientific understanding is insufficient to constrain expectations to that extent. 11 A longer version of the same explanation can be given in terms of structural uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty about the form that climate model equations should take. Scientists are not yet in a position to confidently identify and represent in their modeling equations all of the physical, chemical and biological processes that will significantly shape the extent of climate change in response to increased greenhouse gas emissions. The importance of some processes and feedbacks is unclear, as is how to represent others that are known to be important, such as cloud formation. Moreover, there remains a non-negligible but difficult-to-quantify risk of "unknown unknowns" -causal factors of which scientists remain unaware but that nevertheless will influence the extent of climate change significantly. So structural uncertainty itself cannot be accurately represented with a single probability distribution (whether this is a distribution over model structures or over projected changes) and thus neither can uncertainty about future climate change, insofar as structural uncertainty is one component of it. (Mastrandrea et al. 2010 ) emphasizes that IPCC authors should "evaluate and communicate uncertainty at the appropriate level of precision" (p.2) and that the appropriate level will vary with the finding or hypothesis under consideration, depending on the evidence available.
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According to the guidance note, where evidence is very limited, uncertainty may be more appropriately expressed in qualitative terms and, moreover, even when quantitative expressions of uncertainty are justified, an appropriate expression may take the form of an imprecise (or interval) probability specification (ibid, p.3).
In some cases, there may be "sufficient information" to justify an interval that is relatively narrow (e.g. 90-95% probability), but in many cases the interval probability assignment may need to be rather broad, with bounds that are themselves somewhat fuzzy/uncertain (ibid). The guidance also provides some "calibrated language" -it relates a set of terms to particular (fuzzy) probability intervals -to promote consistency throughout the report (see Table 1 below). Accordingly, if a finding or hypothesis is characterized as likely by the IPCC experts, this indicates an interval probability assignment of (approximately) 0.66-1.0.
IPCC AR5 Likelihood Scale

Term Probability Interval
Virtually certain 99-100%
Very likely 90-100%
Likely
66-100%
About as likely as not 33-66%
Unlikely 0-33%
Very unlikely 0-10%
Exceptionally unlikely 0-1% Figure 1 demonstrates an application of such fuzzy, interval probabilities from the previous IPCC assessment report (IPCC 2007) . For each scenario shown, the IPCC experts deemed it likely that the actual temperature change would fall within a range extending from 40% below the mean of projections from stateof-the-art models to 60% above that mean. That is, they concluded that the hypothesis that the temperature change would be in that range could be assigned an imprecise probability of at least 0.66. 15 The discussion associated with the figure suggests that this uncertainty estimate was based on a number of relevant considerations, including the several ensemble studies whose results are also depicted in the figure, the experts' beliefs about the limitations of those studies (e.g. limitations in their treatment of carbon cycle uncertainties), as well as the experts' broader physical understanding of the climate system (see Meehl et al. 2007a, p.810) . The details of the process by which the specified ranges were determined to be likely, however, were not given. Unfortunately, such details often are omitted, making it difficult to evaluate the procedures used. In fact, at present, it is not entirely clear what the best-available methods for arriving at coarser estimates of uncertainty regarding future climate change are or could be. Nevertheless, whatever their details turn out to be, we can expect that they will prompt scientists to take into account all relevant data/results as well as any recognized limitations (i.e. biases, shortcomings, etc.) of the studies in which those data/results were produced. In effect, they will include an analogue of the move called for by the BRDC, but with more flexibility -they will require scientists to characterize the limitations of their evidence-gathering methods, but they will not require scientists to do so in the language of single-valued probabilities. This analogue of the BRDC may be within reach, even when the traditional BRDC is not. For instance, scientists might be able to articulate good reasons for considering it unlikely (i.e. probability ≤ approximately 0.33) that the change in global mean surface temperature during the 21 st century would be more than 2 degrees Celsius outside the range projected by a particular ensemble of today's models, even if they are not in a position to say exactly how the distribution of results from those models would have been different if alternative (reasonable) choices had been made in the 16 The guidance provided for the AR5 emphasizes the importance of giving a traceable account of the evaluation of evidence that led to a particular uncertainty estimate (see Mastrandrea et al. 2010, p.2 ).
course of model development. Their reasons might appeal to basic physical understanding of the climate system, the performance of the models in simulating past climate changes, etc. Justification for this level of discrimination/precision in characterizing uncertainty might well be possible, even when it is not possible for much more refined discriminations.
It is now perhaps easier to see why, even if social values sometimes do come into play in the model development process in the ways suggested by Winsberg, the influence of those values on estimates of uncertainty will be reduced when coarser estimates are given. The influence will be reduced insofar as choices in model development will less often make a difference to the uncertainty estimates produced. Whereas any change to the distribution of modeling results in an ensemble study will change the single-valued probabilities estimated as a function of that distribution (assuming no fortuitous cancelation in the effects of the changes to the distribution), coarser estimates will be less sensitive to such changes, often much less so. Consider, for instance, the IPCC categories in Table 1 . Even if projections from today's models for a particular quantity X were somewhat different, this would not necessarily move a hypothesis about X from one category to another, e.g., from likely to very likely. Indeed, given the recognized limitations of both today's climate models and the design of today's ensemble studies (see e.g. Tebaldi and Knutti 2007; Parker 2010) , small or even moderate changes in the distribution of such projections should not have much impact in uncertainty analyses, at least not for many quantities/variables; granting such impact would indicate a failure to appreciate those limitations.
A more traditional reply?
Having examined Winsberg's model-based challenge to the Jeffreyan view, it is worth noting that a more traditional reply to Jeffrey seems almost tailor-made for the discussion surrounding uncertainty estimates in climate prediction. This more traditional reply -outlined by Rudner (1953) , Douglas (2009) and others -focuses on second-order uncertainty and is untouched by the move from precise probabilistic to coarser uncertainty estimates.
The reply goes roughly as follows: Estimates of uncertainty are themselves always somewhat uncertain; any decision to offer a particular estimate of uncertainty implies a judgment that this second-order uncertainty is insignificant/unimportant; but such a judgment is a value judgment, as it is concerned with (among other things) how bad the consequences of error (inaccuracy) would be; hence even decisions to offer coarser uncertainty estimates at least implicitly reflect value judgments (see e.g. Douglas 2009, p.85) . A variation on this reply argues not just that uncertainty estimates always implicitly reflect value judgments but also that scientists ought to explicitly consider how bad the consequences of offering an inaccurate depiction of uncertainty would be and are remiss if they fail to do so (see ibid, Ch.4). Douglas (ibid.), for instance, argues for the latter by appeal to the general moral responsibilities that agents have to consider the consequences of their actions.
These arguments are provocative in their own right and merit further examination. We might wonder, for example, whether it is possible to give an account of "doing the best one can" in gauging and representing one's uncertainty (including perhaps one's second-order or even higher-order uncertainty) such that, if one succeeds in "doing the best one can", then one does not have any further moral obligation to consider the consequences of error/inaccuracy in one's uncertainty estimates. However, this and other ways of trying to resist the traditional reply will not be explored in any detail here. 17 Instead, the aims of this section will be more modest: first, to show briefly how the traditional reply seems to dovetail with recent discussionsinternal to climate science -concerning the offering of precise probabilistic estimates of uncertainty and, second, to draw attention to some more general issues connected with these discussions and debates in the climate context.
As noted above, the use of ensemble methods that deliver (what appear to be) precise probabilistic uncertainty estimates is increasingly common. In some cases, these methods are applied with real-world decision makers who are trying to plan for future climate change as the intended consumers of their results (see e.g. Murphy et al. 2009 ). Some climate researchers, however, have suggested that providing these precise probabilistic uncertainty estimates is inappropriate, first and foremost because current understanding is insufficient to warrant such precision, but in addition because of the adverse consequences that might result from offering overly precise estimates. 18 The possible adverse consequences that have been identified include both a loss of credibility for climate science and unnecessary harm to human populations, the latter as a result of decision makers taking at face value these probabilities and making poorer decisions than they would have made with coarser estimates that more accurately reflect the limits of current understanding. This at least suggests that some parties to the discussion not only share Douglas's view that, before offering uncertainty estimates, scientists ought to consider the consequences of inaccuracy but, in addition, believe that when it comes to expressing uncertainty about future climate change there are epistemically (and perhaps morally)
better options than precise probabilities.
A closer look reveals that at least some studies producing (what appear to be) precise probabilistic uncertainty estimates do explicitly acknowledge the existence of second-order uncertainty, but they 17 At least two philosophers have expressed doubt that the traditional reply is even a legitimate reply to Jeffrey. Mitchell (2004) sees a problematic conflation of belief and action. Winsberg (personal communication, 4 May 2013) argues that worries about second-order uncertainty would be moot for Jeffrey, insofar as Jeffrey insists that individuals always do have precise degrees of belief, which can be revealed by their betting behavior. Winsberg's model-based argument is intended to create trouble for Jeffrey even granting his assumption that individuals always have precise degrees of belief. 18 The latter concerns have been expressed more often in talks and in informal discussion than in print, but see e.g. Stainforth et al. 2007 and Smith 2009. nevertheless give confusing advice regarding the proper interpretation of study results. For instance, the extensive report accompanying one prominent ensemble study includes the following guidance:
"Probabilistic projections, although they are designed to quantify uncertainty, require us to make a number of assumptions in their development, and hence they are themselves uncertain. …what may be an unacceptable uncertainty for one user may be quite acceptable for another application. However, as a general guideline we suggest that users should be able to use the distribution from the 10% to the 90% probability levels, but not outside this range, although data covering the full range is available. For some variables the limits may be more stringent than this" (Murphy et al. 2009, p.92 ).
This gives the impression that users can take roughly at face value much of the probabilistic information produced in the study, which does not sit well with acknowledgements elsewhere in the report (e.g. p.34) that some significant sources of uncertainty have not been taken into account.
In more general terms, the source of the difficulty here seems to be that sometimes experts are willing to offer uncertainty estimates that they nevertheless are not willing to fully own, i.e. that they would agree are (in one or more ways) inaccurate depictions of the extent to which current understanding can constrain their expectations about future climate change (see also Parker 2010; Winsberg 2012; Rougier and Crucifix 2012) . In the climate context, this is likely occurring in part because, while methods for producing (overly) precise probabilistic uncertainty estimates are available, implementable, and deliver quantitative results in a familiar form, methods for producing coarser estimates with the help of expert judgment remain in their infancy, are unfamiliar, and may be perceived as lacking in rigor. Thus, even if it is recognized that uncertainty about future climate change would be more accurately characterized with some or other coarser estimate, it may seem easier to apply existing methods that deliver precise probabilities. Further work is needed on how to handle situations in which the ostensible results of an uncertainty estimation study are not ones that the researchers conducting the study can fully own and, in the bigger picture, on how to more easily conduct studies that do allow for ownership of results. 
Conclusions
Winsberg has opened an important discussion regarding the extent to which social values are operating in the "nooks and crannies" (Winsberg 2012, p.130 ) of complex simulation modeling. This paper raised two objections to his argument that social values unavoidably influence estimates of uncertainty about future climate change. First, the argument overlooks the possibility (indeed the plausibility) that pragmatic factors often determine epistemically unforced choices in model development; it need not be social values that "fill the gap" when making such choices. Second, the argument's focus on precise probabilistic uncertainty estimates is somewhat misplaced since, given the limitations of current understanding, uncertainty about future climate change is more appropriately depicted with coarser estimates. Moreover, we can expect that coarser estimates will be less sensitive to any influence that social values have via the model-development process. Neither of these objections shows Winsberg's conclusion to be mistaken, but together they suggest 
